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Abstract — In cloud storage, the third-party auditor (TPA) will perform public 
auditing and data integrity check to maintain the integrity of outsourced data stored in 
the cloud server. To avoid possible user privacy leakage in the auditing process, the 
TPA should learn nothing about the user. This paper presents a new auditing scheme 
which can keep the TPA from learning any user data block in an earlier stage – in 
contrast to previous schemes. Simulation runs are carried out to examine the privacy 
preserving performance of our new scheme and related schemes. The results show that 
our scheme is able to produce better privacy protection at no more computation time 
cost for involved entities, i.e., the user, server and TPA. 
Index Terms — Cloud storage, privacy preserving, third-party auditing, experimental 
evaluation.  
——————————      —————————— 
1   Introduction 
Cloud storage allows users to store data in a very handy way, but how 
to maintain the integrity of outsourced data stored in the cloud server 
remains a major concern and important investigation topic. To check the 
integrity of outsourced data, which is quite a difficult task as local data 
can be deleted after a user saves it to the cloud, we need an efficient 
trustworthy third-party auditor (TPA) to perform public auditing. The 
TPA must be a completely trustworthy third party with no possibility to 
fetch user data or invade user privacy when checking the integrity of 
cloud data. That is, a TPA should learn nothing about users to avoid 
possible privacy leakage during the auditing process.  
 Following the vigorous rise of cloud applications, a number of 
investigations have come up with different schemes to secure the third-
party auditing process so as to enhance the TPA’s auditing [1-12]. 
Among the researches, [1] proposes a basic scheme which uses compact 
Proofs of the Retrievability (PoR) to enhance user privacy in cloud 
storage public auditing. The PoR scheme nevertheless faces a problem: 
Its practice may allow the TPA to learn about users’ personal data in the 
auditing process, hence inducing privacy leakage. To better preserve user 
privacy, some follow-up schemes involve different designs to improve 
the auditing process of PoR. For instance, the Blind scheme [2] tries to 
enhance user privacy protection by blinding certain parameters. In 
contrast to the original PoR, the blinding design earns better privacy 
protection but is still vulnerable to privacy leakage – as it fails to keep 
the TPA totally from fetching users’ data in the auditing process.   
The major goal of our investigation in this paper is to lessen the 
privacy leakage problem in the above third party auditing process in order 
to advance user privacy protection. That is, we will build an efficient new 
auditing scheme which can improve previous auditing practices to attain 
more desirable privacy preservation for cloud data storage. Our basic idea 
is to keep the TPA from learning any user data block in an earlier stage. 
In our design, we will generate a random parameter p in the early stage 
of key generation, use the parameter to blind metadata σi which contains 
data block mi and then send p to the server. When the server receives a 
challenge message from the TPA for data auditing, it will calculate the 
corresponding proof by σi, mi and p, and return the result to the TPA. The 
TPA then starts the auditing process by the received proof and public key 
pk (generated by the user) to check data integrity.  
To examine the privacy preserving performance of our new scheme, 
we first use a zero knowledge proof to illustrate our ability to keep the 
TPA from practically fetching users’ data. We also use the Pairing-Based 
Cryptography (PBC) library to simulate the performance of our scheme 
and related schemes in different situations. As the obtained simulated 
results demonstrate, in contrast to existing auditing schemes, our new 
scheme can substantially advance user privacy protection with no 
additional computation time for the three involved entities: the user, the 
server and the TPA.  
2   Backgrounds and Related Schemes 
The assumed possible target threats on user data include (1) data 
integrity threats and (2) user privacy leakage threats:   
(1) Data integrity threats may come from both internal and external 
attacks at cloud servers, such as software bugs, hardware failures, bugs in 
the network path, economically motivated hackers, malicious or 
accidental management errors, etc. As cloud servers can be self-interested, 
they may likely hide such data corruption incidents for their own benefits 
in order to maintain reputation [2]. 
 (2) User privacy leakage threats are our major concern in this 
investigation. The threats may come from the TPA who learns the 
outsourced data after the auditing. For instance, the TPA may derive the 
content of user data from the information collected in the auditing process. 
To check the integrity of outsourced data, we need an efficient 
trustworthy TPA to perform public auditing to prevent data integrity 
threats. The TPA must be a completely trustworthy third party with no 
possibility to fetch user data or invade user privacy when checking the 
integrity of cloud data. However, a TPA could learn user data during the 
auditing process and bring up user privacy leakage threats. 
The third party auditing process usually includes User Setup and 
TPA Auditing phases. User Setup contains two steps: key generation 
(KeyGen) and signature generation (SigGen). A user will produce the 
needed parameters (i.e., public and secret keys) in KeyGen and send its 
data as well as the metadata to the server in SigGen. TPA Auditing also 
contains two steps: proof generation (ProofGen) and proof verification 
(VerifyProof). In ProofGen, the TPA first sends the challenge to the 
server which then generates the corresponding proof and sends it back. 
Receiving the proof, the TPA will audit the user's data and return the 
results to the user in VerifyProof.  
The following notations are given to facilitate our later illustration of 
related auditing schemes. 
F: the user's data containing blocks m1, m2, ..., mi, ..., mn 
H(): {0,1}* → G1, the hash function which maps the input uniformly 
to G1 
h(): GT → Zp, the hash function which maps elements of GT to Zp. 
g: the generator of G2 
2.1 The PoR Scheme [1] 
The scheme features Compact Proofs of Retrievability and is hence 
briefed as the PoR scheme [2-4]. It has the following auditing process: 
▲User Setup 
*KeyGen  
(1) choose a random secret key x ∈ Zp 
(2) choose random elements u, name ∈ G1 
(3) choose a random element g ∈ G2 
(4) compute υ = gx 
(5) generate the secret key sk = (x) and public key pk = (u, g, υ, name) 
 
*SigGen 
(1) compute metadata σi for each data block mi, 𝜎𝑖 = (𝐻(𝑊𝑖)  ∗ 𝑢
𝑚𝑖)𝑥, 
Wi = name||i. 
(2) send F and Φ = {σi }1≦i≦n to the server 
▲TPA Auditing 
*ProofGen 
(1) The TPA picks random c data blocks to audit (assume the collection 
is I, I = {s1,.....,sc}, c < n). 
(2) The TPA chooses random c elements{νi ∈ Zp}i∈I. 
(3) The TPA generates a challenge message chal={(i, νi)}i∈I to the server. 
(4) Receiving chal, the server calculates the proof message P={σ, μ} 
(𝜎 = ∏ 𝜎𝑖
𝜈𝑖 𝑖∈𝐼 ; 𝜇 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖  ∗  𝜈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ) and sends P back to the TPA. 
 
*VerifyProof 
(1) Receiving the proof message, the TPA verifies the following equation 
by the public key pk which the user generates: 
 𝑒(𝜎, 𝑔) = 𝑒( (∏ 𝐻(𝑊𝑖)
𝜈𝑖)  ∗  𝑢𝜇𝑖∈𝐼 , 𝜐 ). 
(2) Return True if the equation is true or False otherwise. 
 
The PoR scheme, as we have observed, may induce possible user 
privacy leakage because the server needs to send the proof message P (= 
{σ, μ}) along with parameter μ to the TPA. For instance, the TPA can 
learn about data m1 – and all other blocks – by the following steps: 
 
(1) It first picks blocks m2~m9 to audit and stores 𝜇2,9 after receiving 
proof P from the server, 𝑃 = {𝜎2,9 , 𝜇2,9} (𝜇2,9 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖
9
𝑖=2 ). 
(2) It again picks m1~m9 to audit and stores 𝜇1,9 = 𝑚1 ∗ 𝜈1 + 𝜇2,9 after 
receiving proof P from the server, 𝑃 = {𝜎1,9 , 𝜇1,9}  ( 𝜇1,9 =
∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖
9
𝑖=1 ). 
(3) It then guesses on the random value of m1', calculates 𝜇1,9′ = 𝑚1′ ∗
𝜈1 + 𝜇2,9 , and uses the result to verify equation  𝑒(𝜎, 𝑔) =
𝑒( (∏ 𝐻(𝑊𝑖)
𝜈𝑖)  ∗  𝑢𝜇1,9
′9
𝑖=1 , 𝜐 ). 
(4) If the equation is true, it gets the correct value of m1' and uses it to 
learn about m1 – user privacy hence leaks. If the equation is false, it 
can go back to (3) to repeat the guessing attempt. 
 
2.2 The Blind Scheme [2] 
The Blind scheme is basically similar to the PoR scheme except that 
it uses a blind way to avoid possible user privacy leakage in PoR (due to 
the fetch of parameter μ). Blind tries to preserve user privacy by 
generating a random parameter r to blind parameter μ. It functions as 
follows. 
▲User Setup 
*KeyGen (same as PoR) 
*SigGen (same as PoR) 
 
▲TPA Auditing 
*ProofGen 
(1) The TPA picks random c blocks to audit (assume the collection is I = 
{s1,.....,sc}, c < n). 
(2) The TPA chooses random c elements{νi ∈ Zp}i∈I. 
(3) The TPA generates a challenge message chal={(i, νi)}i∈I to the server. 
(4) Receiving chal, the server calculates the proof message P={R, σ, μ} 
by choosing a random parameter r and attaining  𝑅 = 𝑒(𝑢, 𝜐)𝑟 , 𝛾 =
 ℎ(𝑅), 𝜎 = ∏ 𝜎𝑖
𝜈𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼  and 𝜇 = 𝑟 + 𝛾 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 . 
(5) The server sends proof P back to the TPA. 
 
*VerifyProof 
(1) After receiving proof P, the TPA calculatesγ= h(R) by the public key 
pk and verifies the following equation 
 𝑅 ∗ 𝑒(𝜎𝛾, 𝑔) = 𝑒( (∏ 𝐻(𝑊𝑖)
𝜈𝑖)𝛾  ∗  𝑢𝜇𝑖∈𝐼 , 𝜐 ). 
(2) Return True if the equation is true or False otherwise. 
 
By using an additional random parameter r to blind parameter μ, the 
Blind scheme improves the user privacy leakage problem in the PoR 
scheme. Despite of the improvement, Blind also confronts possible 
privacy leakages because the TPA can still find ways to fetch any data 
blocks. We use the following data m1 as an example to illustrate such 
leaking possibility. 
 
(1) The TPA can get parameter r from parameter R by steps (a) and (b). 
(a) After receiving P = {R, σ, μ} (𝑅 = 𝑒(𝑢, 𝜐)𝑟) from the server, it 
guesses upon r' and uses it to verify equation 𝑅 = 𝑒(𝑢, 𝜐)𝑟
′
. 
(b) If the equation is true, it learns that r' is correct; if false, repeat (a). 
(2) It picks blocks m2~m9 to audit and stores 𝜇2,9 after receiving P from 
the server, 𝑃 = {𝑅, 𝜎2,9 , 𝜇2,9} (𝜇2,9 = 𝑟 + 𝛾 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖
9
𝑖=2 ). 
(3) It again picks blocks m1~m9 to audit and, after receiving 
𝑃 = {𝑅, 𝜎1,9 , 𝜇1,9} from the server, stores 𝜇1,9 = 𝑟 + 𝛾 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖
9
𝑖=1   
i.e., 𝜇1,9 = 𝛾 ∗ 𝑚1 ∗ 𝜈1 + 𝜇2,9. 
(4) It then guesses on the random value of m1', calculates 𝜇1,9′ = 𝛾 ∗
𝑚1′ ∗ 𝜈1 + 𝜇2,9 and uses the result to verify equation  
𝑒(𝜎𝛾, 𝑔) = 𝑒( (∏ 𝐻(𝑊𝑖)
𝜈𝑖)9𝑖=1
𝛾
 ∗  𝑢𝜇1,9
′
, 𝜐 ). 
(5) If the equation is true, it knows m1' is correct and use it to get m1 (user 
privacy thus leaks); if false, it can return to (4) to repeat the guessing 
attempt. 
 
3   The Proposed Scheme 
Our basic idea, as mentioned, is to keep the TPA from learning any 
user data block in an earlier stage. That is, to prevent user privacy leakage, 
we can conduct – in advance – some calculation on user data blocks 
without affecting the original third-party public auditing features. The 
idea leads us to the construction of an efficient new scheme which will 
blind each user data block in an earlier stage to avoid possible user 
privacy leakage in the auditing process and to secure better privacy 
protection than existing schemes, including the PoR scheme and other 
blind schemes.  Different from the original Blind scheme [2], our new 
scheme will generate a random parameter p in the key generation stage 
and use p to blind metadata σi which contains data block mi. After the 
calculation, the user sends parameter p to the server. When a TPA sends 
a challenge message to the server for data auditing, the server will 
calculate the corresponding proof by metadata σi, data block mi and 
random parameter p, and return the proof to the TPA. The TPA then uses 
the received proof and the public key pk (generated by the user) to audit 
data integrity. Such a simple but effective practice can practically solidify 
user privacy protection because it helps reduce the probability of privacy 
leakage as much as possible during the auditing process. 
Our new scheme works as follows. 
▲User Setup 
* KeyGen 
(1) choose random secret keys p, x ∈ Zp 
(2) choose random elements u, name ∈ G1 
(3) choose a random element g ∈ G2 
(4) compute υ = gx 
(5) generate secret key sk = (p,x) and public key pk = (u, g, υ, name) 
 
* SigGen 
(1) compute metadata σi for each data block mi, 𝜎𝑖 = (𝐻(𝑊𝑖)  ∗ 𝑢
𝑝∗𝑚𝑖)𝑥, 
Wi = name||i. 
(2) send p, F and Φ = {σi }1≦i≦n to the server 
 
▲TPA Auditing 
* ProofGen 
(1) The TPA picks random c blocks to audit (assume the collection of c is 
I, I = {s1,.....,sc}, c < n). 
(2) It then chooses random c elements{νi ∈ Zp}i∈I, generates a challenge 
message chal = {(i, νi)}i∈I and sends chal to the server. 
(3) Receiving chal, the server will calculate proof message P = {σ, μ} 
(𝜎 = ∏ 𝜎𝑖
𝜈𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼 ; 𝜇 = 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ) and send P to the TPA. 
 
* VerifyProof 
(1) Receiving proof P, the TPA moves to verify the following equation by 
the public key pk (generated by the user): 
𝑒(𝜎, 𝑔) = 𝑒( (∏ 𝐻(𝑊𝑖)
𝜈𝑖)  ∗  𝑢𝜇𝑖∈𝐼 , 𝜐 ). 
(2) Return True if the equation is true or False otherwise. 
Note that, in the above auditing process, when we maintain the 
equation to be true so that the TPA can audit data integrity, we meanwhile 
ensure better privacy preservation for the user – due to the reduction of 
some auditing process and also some parameters in the original Blind 
scheme. The reduction in the auditing process and parameters can 
effectively refrain the TPA from learning about the user data. The major 
advantage of our new scheme lies in that, without incurring additional 
computation time, it improves the privacy leakage problem in related 
schemes and meanwhile maintains the required third-party public data 
auditing ability. More specifically, with some extra calculation, our 
different design is able to enhance user privacy preservation at no 
additional computation time cost (to be further demonstrated in the next 
section).  
 
4   Performance Evaluation 
4.1 The Zero Knowledge Proof 
The following zero knowledge proof will demonstrate our ability to 
preserve user privacy in the auditing process. Recall that, in our scheme, 
the TPA knows all parameters except the secret keys (p and x) and data 
block mi. To learn about data block mi, the TPA must work out on 
parameters σ and μ which are sent by the server and contain mi. It 
nevertheless cannot get mi from σ (𝜎 = ∏ (𝐻(𝑊𝑖)  ∗ 𝑢
𝑚𝑖∗𝑝)𝑥∗𝜈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ) when 
auditing a single block because, to audit a single block m1, it will receive 
proof message P = {σ, μ} from the server, where 
 𝜎 = (𝐻(𝑊1)  ∗ 𝑢
𝑚1∗𝑝)𝑥∗𝜈1.  
To get m1, the TPA needs to guess on the random values of m1', x' and p' 
in the first place, calculate 
 𝜎′ = (𝐻(𝑊1) ∗ 𝑢
𝑚1′∗𝑝′)
𝑥′∗𝜈1
= 𝐻(𝑊1)
𝑥′∗𝜈1  ∗ 𝑢𝑚1
′∗𝑝′∗𝑥′∗𝜈1 
and then compare if σ = σ'. If σ = σ', the TPA will take the guessed value 
of m1' as the true value of m1. The problem is, even if σ = σ', the correct 
m1 will not necessarily equal the guessed m1' – because there are 
obviously more than one set of (m1', x', p') which makes σ = σ'. That is to 
say, even if the TPA makes out the values of m1', x' and p' which lead to σ 
= σ', it may not get the true value of m1.  
For similar reasons, the TPA can neither use μ (𝜇 = 𝑝 ∗ ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ) 
to learn about mi when auditing a single block. When the TPA is to audit 
a single block m1, it will receive 𝜇 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑚1 ∗ 𝜈1 from the server. To get 
m1, it must guess on the random values of m1' and p', calculate 𝜇′ =
𝑝′ ∗ 𝑚1′ ∗ 𝜈1 and then compare if μ = μ'. If μ = μ', it will take the guessed 
value of m1' as the true value of m1. But when multiple (m1', p') sets make 
μ = μ' (as in the above case of σ = σ'), the guessed m1' may not be the 
correct m1. Obviously, if the TPA fails to get mi when auditing a single 
data block, it will not get mi when auditing multiple data blocks because 
– when asking to audit multiple data blocks, it will confront σ and μ whose 
values are respectively the product and sum of the multiple blocks.  
4.2 The Computation Time 
To attain advanced performance evaluation, we carry out extended 
simulation runs to collect the required computation time in PoR, Blind 
and our new scheme (Ours) for comparisons. We set up three entities to 
represent the TPA, user and server by virtual machines and use the 
Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library [13] and C programming 
language as the tools. The main purpose is to exhibit we attain the 
performance gain in user privacy preservation (i.e., attain better user 
privacy protection) at no additional cost of computation time in 
comparison to the other target schemes.  
(1) The User Computation Time    
Figure 1 depicts the user computation time for the three schemes. The 
user computation time indicates the time required for the user setup phase 
which includes key generation and signature generation steps. Consider 
the fact that different data sizes involve different user computation time, 
we hence divide the overall user computation time by the number of data 
blocks to get UCTPB (user computation time per block) in milliseconds 
(ms). In Figure 1, c is the number of data blocks the TPA is to audit (we 
set c = 300 and 460, as in [2]).  
Figure 1 depicts quite similar UCTPB values for all three schemes. In 
𝜎𝑖 = (𝐻(𝑊𝑖)  ∗ 𝑢
𝑝∗𝑚𝑖)𝑥 – the formula to calculate metadata σi for each 
data block mi, we find our scheme takes one more power computation for 
each data block because we need to calculate up*mi, whereas PoR and 
Blind each calculate only umi. To reduce the increase in computation time, 
we act by conducting the multiplication p*mi first because it takes only 
another multiplication computation, instead of power computation, for 
each data block. The act, as Figure 1 shows, substantially reduces the user 
computation time for our scheme. 
 
 
Figure 1. The user computation time for various schemes. 
 (2) The Server Computation Time   
Figure 2 gives the server computation time for the three schemes. The 
server computation time starts when the server receives a challenge 
message from the TPA and ends when it completes calculating the proof 
message. Figure 2 again shows similar results for all schemes, indicating 
that our new scheme yields better performance in privacy protection than 
PoR and Blind – without additional cost in server computation time. Note 
that we do not consume additional server computation time mainly 
because we take no more computations than the Blind scheme to blind 
each data block and need only one extra multiplication p ( 𝜇 = 𝑝 ∗
∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ) in contrast to the PoR scheme (𝜇 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖 ∗ 𝜈𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ). 
  
(3) The TPA Computation Time 
    
 
Figure 2. The server computation time for various schemes. 
Table 1. The comparison among the PoR scheme, the Blind scheme  
and our scheme 
  The PoR scheme [1]
  
The Blind scheme 
[2] 
Our scheme 
Basics PoR PoR PoR 
Phases User Setup: KeyGen 
and SigGen  
TPA Auditing: 
ProofGen and 
VerifyProof 
User Setup: KeyGen 
and SigGen  
(same as PoR) 
TPA Auditing: 
ProofGen and 
VerifyProof  
(generate r) 
User Setup: KeyGen 
and SigGen  
(generate p) 
TPA Auditing: 
ProofGen and 
VerifyProof 
Enhancing 
privacy  
no generate a random 
parameter r to blind 
parameter μ during 
TPA auditing 
generate a random 
parameter p in the early 
stage of key generation, 
use the parameter to 
blind metadata σi which 
contains data block mi 
and then send p to the 
server 
Effective-
ness 
induce possible user 
privacy leakage 
because the server 
needs to send the proof 
message P (= {σ, μ}) 
along with parameter μ 
to the TPA 
confront possible user 
privacy leakage 
because the TPA can 
still find ways to fetch 
any data blocks 
reduce some auditing 
process and some 
parameters in the Blind 
scheme to effectively 
refrain the TPA from 
learning about the user 
data 
User 
privacy 
leakage 
yes yes no 
Zero 
knowledge 
proved 
no no yes 
Extra user 
computa-
tion 
no no no 
Extra 
server 
computa-
tion 
no no no 
Extra TPA 
computa-
tion 
no yes (one extra 
multiplication (*R) 
and two extra power-
of-γ computations) 
no 
 
The TPA auditing process listed in previous sections for the three 
schemes shows that PoR and our new scheme take the same TPA 
computation time because both conduct totally identical TPA 
computation in the auditing process. Among the schemes, Blind 
consumes the most TPA computation time due to its application of one 
extra multiplication (*R) and two extra power-of-γcomputations. 
A comparison table is listed in Table 1 to help recap the features of 
the three target schemes. 
4.3 Other Disscusions 
A number of more recent approaches, e.g., [9,12,14-16], have been 
introduced in the literature to enhance the third-party auditing process. 
Among the schemes, some [9] employs the key-exposure resilience 
technique to update the secret keys in order to reduce the damage of 
client key exposure during cloud storage auditing. Some [14] attempts to 
ensure the security of stored data by decomposing the whole encrypted 
file into different pieces and storing the pieces in randomly chosen cloud 
servers – to keep key authorities from decrypting the complete file. The 
design improves not only security but also the processing burden of a 
single server. The other schemes include introducing a proxy into the 
traditional public auditing system to release data owners out of online 
burden [12] or to audit the shared data in cloud by means of the group 
signature [15] or secret sharing [16]. We believe that, with any of these 
approaches brought to work with our new scheme, we can turn over 
stronger performance, in addition to proper user privacy preservation – 
which is our major goal in this investigation. 
 
 5   Conclusions 
In cloud storage, the third-party auditor (TPA) performs public 
auditing and data integrity check to help maintain the integrity of 
outsourced data stored in the cloud server. During the auditing process, it 
is obvious that the TPA should learn nothing about the user to avoid 
possible user privacy leakage. Seeing that the practice of existing auditing 
schemes cannot fully keep the TPA from fetching users’ private data, we 
hence introduce an efficient new auditing scheme in this paper to secure 
better user privacy protection. Different from previous schemes, our new 
scheme will keep the TPA from learning user data blocks in an earlier 
stage. Our basic practice is to generate a random parameter p in the key 
generation stage, use parameter p to blind metadata σi which contains data 
block mi and then send p to the server. When the server receives a 
challenge message from the TPA asking for data auditing, it will calculate 
the proof by σi, mi and p, and return the result to the TPA. Receiving the 
proof message from the server, the TPA then starts the auditing process 
by both the proof and public key pk (generated by the user) to check data 
integrity. Such a practice can avoid potential user privacy leakage as 
much as possible to uplift privacy preservation. Extensive simulation has 
been carried out to check the privacy preserving performance of different 
auditing schemes, including the PoR scheme, the Blind scheme and our 
new scheme. Our new scheme, as obtained results exhibit, yields better 
privacy protection than the other two schemes at no more computation 
time cost for all involved entities – the user, the server and the TPA. 
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